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MINI-DOMAS AS POLITICAL PROCESS FAILURES: 
THE CASE FOR HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY OF 
STATE ANTI-GAY MARRIAGE AMENDMENTS 
Steve Sanders* 
INTRODUCTION 
Lawsuits seeking gay and lesbian marriage equality are piling up—
more than seventy separate cases in thirty-two jurisdictions as of this 
writing1—and advocates are racing to the Supreme Court to see which case 
might settle the question for the whole nation. As these cases move up 
swiftly through the federal courts, it is becoming increasingly difficult to 
see how the Justices can avoid a final reckoning on the question of same-
sex marriage during their October 2014 term. 
Indeed, it does not seem an exaggeration to describe same-sex 
marriage advocates’ apparent strategy as one of “shock and awe.” Marriage 
equality is on a winning streak of more than a dozen cases since the 
Supreme Court’s decision last summer in United States v. Windsor,2 the 
primary authority on which lower courts have relied.3 Windsor invalidated 
the federal Defense of Marriage Act, but even more importantly, the Court 
spoke with warm empathy toward gay and lesbian Americans’ quest for 
equal marriage rights. Specifically, the majority wrote that the “equal 
dignity of same-sex marriages” may not be undermined by laws whose 
“principal purpose is to impose inequality.”4 
Windsor was a breakthrough equal protection decision, but it arose 
within a framework of federalism: protecting the prerogatives of pro-
marriage equality states against an overreaching and ill-intentioned 
Congress. As various commentators have suggested, Windsor’s thinly 
 
* Associate Professor, Maurer School of Law, Indiana University Bloomington. Please direct 
comments to stevesan@indiana.edu. I am grateful for encouragement and suggestions received on this 
essay in workshops at the University of Wisconsin and Loyola University-Chicago law schools, as well 
as from my colleagues Daniel Conkle and Deborah Widiss. For research assistance, I am grateful to Josh 
Bruce, Kevin Casimer, and Jonathan Hitz. 
1
  The web site http://www.freedomtomarry.org/litigation is tracking all of the cases 
[http://perma.cc/5JZP-UL76]. 
2
  133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) [http://perma.cc/RRK3-P4V2]. 
3
  Michael C. Dorf, Will the Lower Court Consensus on Same-Sex Marriage Influence the Supreme 
Court?, VERDICT (May 28, 2014), http://verdict.justia.com/2014/05/28/will-lower-court-consensus-sex-
marriage-influence-supreme-court (observing that “every single judge to rule on the question has relied 
on Windsor for the conclusion that [same-sex marriage] bans are unconstitutional”) 
[http://perma.cc/6BDZ-6LN3]. 
4
  Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693–94. 
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reasoned, dignity-focused analysis seems inadequate for sweeping aside 
more than thirty state gay marriage bans.5 A decision with such monumental 
consequences for social policy and federalism requires more rigorous 
analysis and deeper roots in traditional equal protection theory. As Justice 
Brandeis is said to have observed, no case is ever fully decided until it is 
rightly decided.6 This principle has haunted the Court’s gay rights cases—
Romer v. Evans, Lawrence v. Texas, and most recently Windsor—all of 
which have suffered criticism for their ambiguous levels of scrutiny and 
lack of doctrinal rigor.7 
If and when the Supreme Court eventually settles the question of gay 
marriage for the nation, the decision will take a place in history beside such 
landmarks as Brown v. Board of Education and Loving v. Virginia, as well 
as in the canon of major international human rights decisions. And so, it is 
important that the Court get this one right: not only the outcome, but also 
the constitutional reasoning. A decision based only on rational basis 
scrutiny (as some of the recent district court decisions have been)8 would 
suffer withering criticism, and a decision with an unspecified standard of 
review, like Windsor, might not be received much better. Most 
commentators agree that the state “mini defense of marriage acts,” or “mini-
DOMAs,” cannot survive true heightened scrutiny.9 But first, the Court—
which has declined numerous opportunities to expressly make sexual 
orientation a suspect or quasi-suspect classification—needs a clear and 
principled basis for getting to heightened scrutiny. 
This Essay suggests that political process theory provides the most 
democratically legitimate justification for the Supreme Court to step in and 
resolve the question of same-sex marriage for the whole country, as it 
seems increasingly likely to do, at a time when a majority of states still 
outlaw the practice. As I will explain, such an approach would not be 
 
5
  See, e.g., Daniel O. Conkle, Evolving Values, Animus, and Same-Sex Marriage, 89 IND. L.J. 27, 33 
(2014) (arguing that the justices in a state marriage case should not “act merely on their own political-
moral judgment” because “it seems premature to conclude that there is a national consensus on this 
issue”) [http://perma.cc/N6D7-CZGN]. 
6
  Attributed to Justice Brandeis in Eugene V. Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial 
Review, 66 HARV. L. REV. 193, 223 (1952) [http://perma.cc/7NSL-VZJT]. 
7
  See, e.g., Mike Dorf, A Publicity Update and Then Three Thoughts on Justice Scalia’s Dissent in 
Windsor, DORF ON LAW (June 28, 2013), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2013/06/a-publicity-update-and-
then-three.html (observing that “there is much to regret about the fact that in Romer, Lawrence and now 
Windsor, the Court has failed to specify the level of scrutiny it is applying as a matter of equal protection 
doctrine (in Romer and Windsor) or substantive due process doctrine (in Lawrence)”) 
[http://perma.cc/XZ43-B3A6]. 
8
  See, e.g., Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1207 (D. Utah 2013) [http://perma.cc/8WFH-
SK37]. 
9
  See, e.g., Conkle, supra note 5, at 42 (“By every indication, the strongest, most candid, and most 
judicious rationale [for invalidating state anti-gay marriage laws] would rest on equal protection, with 
the Court concluding that classifications based on sexual orientation are quasi-suspect, triggering 
heightened scrutiny that marriage prohibitions cannot survive.”). 
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inconsistent with the Court’s recent decision in Schuette v. Coalition to 
Defend Affirmative Action, in which political process theory also played 
some role.10 In focusing on same-sex couples’ right to marry (which, 
notably, is often presented as a premise that assumes its conclusion) courts 
and commentators have largely overlooked the history of how and why the 
mini-DOMAs were enacted. The history and circumstances surrounding the 
twenty-eight mini-DOMAs that are embedded in state constitutions11 
deserve a more prominent examination in federal marriage litigation. 
Collectively, these laws represent a troubling failure of the political 
process. By strong-arming marriage discrimination into state 
constitutions—which typically are far more difficult to change than 
ordinary statutes—during a relatively brief period from 1998 to 2012, mini-
DOMA proponents intended to freeze marriage discrimination in place and 
put it beyond the reach of ordinary democratic deliberation, future 
legislative reconsideration, and state judicial review.  And so the remaining 
mini-DOMAs should receive searching, skeptical judicial review of their 
substance because they are the products of a constitutionally suspect 
lawmaking process. 
This Essay proceeds in four parts. In Part I, I review the recent 
emergence of state constitutional mini-DOMAs. In Part II, I provide 
background on the political process branch of equal protection doctrine. In 
Part III, I explain why, under political process theory, the mini-DOMAs 
should receive heightened scrutiny. Finally, I discuss why the Court’s 
recent decision in Schuette does not prevent the use of political process 
theory that I suggest. 
I. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL MINI-DOMAS:  
HISTORY AND CONSEQUENCES 
Although legal same-sex marriage was not possible in the United 
States up until a decade ago, affirmative and categorical prohibitions on the 
celebration or interstate recognition of same-sex marriages are largely the 
products of only the past twenty years. The first state constitutional mini-
DOMAs were not passed until 1998, when Alaskan and Hawaiian voters 
approved amendments in response to state court rulings favorable to same-
sex marriage.12 
The push for state marriage amendments gained much more 
momentum after the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decided 
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health in 2003, for the first time 
 
10
 Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigrant Rights and Fight for 
Equal. by Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014) [http://perma.cc/7SEF-9697]. 
11
  See Where State Laws Stand, FREEDOM TO MARRY, http://www.freedomtomarry.org/pages/ 
where-state-laws-stand (last updated June 10, 2014) [http://perma.cc/S5TL-H6FL]. 
12
  AMY L. STONE, GAY RIGHTS AT THE BALLOT BOX 33 (2012). 
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making legal same-sex marriage a reality in America.13  Goodridge 
“brought gay marriage to the forefront of political debate in 2004.”14 Social 
conservatives like Republican Senator Wayne Allard of Colorado warned: 
“There is a master plan out there from those who want to destroy the 
institution of marriage.”15 
Marriage equality activists were indeed mapping litigation and 
legislative strategies to slowly win marriage equality state-by-state.  But the 
real “master plan”—along with the money, communication abilities, and 
political muscle to implement it—belonged to social conservatives and their 
political allies, mostly in the Republican Party. Before Goodridge, only 
three states had adopted constitutional mini-DOMAs. But by 2008, a mere 
five years later, more than twenty-five additional states had done so.16 
Until very recently, direct democracy was a disaster for gay rights, a 
fact that goes a long way toward explaining why social conservatives made 
constitutional amendments, which typically must be approved in voter 
referenda, their weapon of choice in the fight against gay marriage. Of the 
thirty-three times that states voted on gay marriage ballot measures between 
1998 and the spring of 2012, opponents of gay marriage won thirty-two 
times.17 In her study of earlier civil rights ballot initiatives, political scientist 
Barbara Gamble found that gays and lesbians had “seen their civil rights put 
to a popular vote more often than any other group.”18 Of forty-three 
gay/lesbian rights initiatives that reached the ballot between 1959 and 1993, 
eighty-eight percent sought to repeal existing gay rights laws or forbid 
legislatures from passing new ones, and voters approved seventy-nine 
percent of these restrictive measures.19 
Today, as the courts confront same-sex marriage, they also confront 
something of a political and legal anomaly. Thirty-one states ban same-sex 
marriage, twenty-eight of these by constitutional amendment.20 Yet a 
majority of the people in those states—fifty-three percent—actually support 
marriage equality.21 Nationwide, support stands at fifty-nine percent, with 
 
13
  Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) [http://perma.cc/XFV2-5PLD]. 
14
  MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS, BACKLASH, AND THE 
STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 97 (2013). 
15
  Id. at 105. 
16
  Id. 
17
  Charles Mahtesian, The Map of Gay Marriage, POLITICO (May 4, 2012, 10:54 PM), 
http://www.politico.com/blogs/charlie-mahtesian/2012/05/the-map-of-gay-marriage-122535.html 
[http://perma.cc/J2UT-PLNR]. 
18
  Barbara S. Gamble, Putting Civil Rights to a Popular Vote, 41 AM. J. POL SCI. 245, 257 (1997) 
[http://perma.cc/YU9Z-EA2F]. 
19
  Id. at 258. 
20
  See Where State Laws Stand, supra note 11. 
21
  Peyton M. Craighill and Scott Clement, Support for Same-Sex Marriage Hits New High; Half Say 
Constitution Guarantees Right, WASH. POST (Mar. 4, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ 
support-for-same-sex-marriage-hits-new-high-half-say-constitution-guarantees-
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half of America believing gay marriage is a constitutional right.22 Of course, 
variation remains from state to state. But even in deeply conservative states 
like Kentucky, where voters ratified a mini-DOMA in 2004, attitudes have 
moved decidedly toward greater acceptance. In 2004, seventy-two percent 
of Kentuckians said they supported a ban on gay marriage.23 Ten years later, 
the number opposed to marriage equality had dropped almost twenty points, 
to fifty-five percent.24 
A bedrock premise of representative democracy is that such attitudinal 
change should portend changes in laws and policies. In this case, greater 
acceptance of marriage equality should be making it easier to repeal 
existing bans state-by-state. But that assumes a political process that is 
responsive to evolving public attitudes and where simple legislative 
majorities can prevail under ordinary lawmaking. But for same-sex 
marriage in twenty-eight of the fifty states, that is not the regime we have. 
II. POLITICAL PROCESS THEORY AND EQUAL PROTECTION 
Broadly stated, the political process approach to an equal protection 
inquiry holds that, when considering how government allocates benefits and 
burdens among groups of citizens, the characteristics of the political 
decision making process that produced an allocation can help to determine 
whether the allocation is constitutionally suspect. Relevant factors include 
whether the process was customary or extraordinary; whether it was 
infected with animus or invidious purposes; whether it inherently 
advantaged one group over another; and whether it remains democratically 
responsive to social and political change. The theory assumes that the first 
line of defense against oppressive, unjust, or ill-conceived laws is a fair, 
open, and responsive lawmaking process. Political process theory is usually 
considered a conservative constitutional methodology because its 
“animating purpose . . . is circumvention of the countermajoritarian 
difficulty inherent in judicial review.”25 
The basic principle that the nature of the process through which a law 
is made can be relevant to equal protection analysis has its origins in United 
States v. Carolene Products Co. The case’s famous footnote four suggested 
 
right/2014/03/04/f737e87e-a3e5-11e3-a5fa-55f0c77bf39c_story.html [http://perma.cc/5KTP-92CX]. 
22
  Id. 
23
  Tom O’Neill, Gay Marriage: Kentucky Still Opposed, but Acceptance Growing, Bluegrass Poll 
Says, COURIER-J. (Feb. 8, 2014), http://archive.courier-journal.com/article/20140207/NEWS01/ 
302070077/Gay-marriage-Kentucky-still-opposed-acceptance-growing-Bluegrass-Poll-says 
[http://perma.cc/5YKC-PRXH]. 
24
  Id. 
25
  Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 747, 
768 (1991); see also Jane S. Schacter, Ely at the Altar: Political Process Theory Through the Lens of the 
Marriage Debate, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1363, 1370–72 (2011) (discussing the origins of political process 
theory) [http://perma.cc/6PH4-R8JM]. 
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that “more exacting judicial scrutiny” may be required for “legislation 
which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to 
bring about repeal of undesirable legislation.”26 Political process theory’s 
most famous exposition came in John Hart Ely’s classic Democracy and 
Distrust, which argued that, under equal protection, the legitimacy of how 
government allocates benefits and burdens should not “be determined 
simply by looking to see who ended up with what,” but instead “by 
attending to the process that brought about the distribution in 
question . . . .”27 
Although the Supreme Court has not expressly embraced political 
process theory, “[t]he ideas spawned by footnote four and Ely are 
embedded in [its] equal protection doctrine.”28 In particular, the Court has 
acknowledged that subjecting ordinary legislative questions to public 
referenda can place special burdens on minorities.29 The Court has also said 
that, in the search for unconstitutional discriminatory purpose, relevant 
factors can include the “historical background” and “sequence of events” 
that produced the challenged law, especially departures from normal 
processes.30 Nearly twenty years ago in Romer, the Court warned that “[a] 
law declaring that in general it shall be more difficult for one group of 
citizens than for all others to seek aid from the government is itself a denial 
of equal protection of the laws in the most literal sense.”31 And Windsor 
teaches that “[i]n determining whether a law is motivated by an improper 
animus or purpose, ‘[d]iscriminations of an unusual character’ especially 
require careful consideration.”32 
III. GETTING TO HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY 
This Essay is not concerned with the constitutionality of individual 
state laws forbidding gay marriage, but rather with how the Supreme Court 
should think about the phenomenon of state mini-DOMAs collectively. 
Even if marriage discrimination is not in itself “unusual,” the process that 
was used to enact it in the United States over the past two decades—swiftly, 
and with the intent that the discrimination be permanent and irreversible—
surely was. At oral argument in Perry v. Hollingsworth (where the Court 
ultimately would duck deciding the constitutionality of a state mini-DOMA 
by dismissing the appeal on standing grounds), Justice Scalia famously 
 
26
  United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) [http://perma.cc/M5P-N6Z6]. 
27
  JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 136 (1980). 
28
  Schacter, supra note 25, at 1372. 
29
  See Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391 (1969) [http://perma.cc/5GD4-3WZH]. 
30
  Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267 (1977) 
[http://perma.cc/MA2H-A6GF]. 
31
  Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996) [http://perma.cc/C89Y-8U76]. 
32
  United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (alteration in original) (quoting Romer, 
517 U.S. at 633). 
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asked: “[W]hen did it become unconstitutional to exclude homosexual 
couples from marriage?”33 Framing the issue this way, of course, is intended 
to trap marriage equality plaintiffs in a quagmire of difficult arguments 
about a “living Constitution” or evolving understandings of equal 
protection. But Justice Scalia’s question is the wrong one. To get to 
heightened scrutiny—and thus shift the burden to states to justify their 
laws—the inquiry should focus on the process that gave us, in a relative 
historical blink of the eye, a new normal of deeply entrenched marriage 
discrimination against gays and lesbians in a majority of states. I would 
suggest that the appropriate question, although perhaps not as punchy as 
Justice Scalia’s, goes something like this: “When did states start erecting 
affirmative and categorical barriers to same-sex marriage, and why do most 
of those barriers exist in the form of constitutional amendments that are 
very difficult to revisit even after public attitudes become more favorable?” 
To put the matter in terms of a more general principle, heighted judicial 
scrutiny is justified where, due to the majority’s deliberate rigging or 
corruption of the process, a minority group “keeps finding itself on the 
wrong end of the [law’s] classifications, for reasons that in some sense are 
discreditable.”34 
For sake of argument, let us assume the Constitution does not provide a 
fundamental right to same-sex marriage, and that gays and lesbians are not 
a suspect class. Let us instead accept the counsel of conservatives like 
Justice Scalia, who urge gays to “promot[e] their agenda through normal 
democratic means” rather than running to the courts because “[s]ocial 
perceptions of sexual and other morality change over time, and every group 
has the right to persuade its fellow citizens that its view of such matters is 
the best.”35 The crucial questions then become: could same-sex marriage 
compete in a fair fight? Did the political process, as it actually played out in 
a majority of states between 1998 and 2012, merely enact a traditional 
definition of marriage, or was it also intended to rig the game for many 
decades into the future? Did it preserve a lawmaking process that is 
accessible and responsive to reasoned debate, where legislators can be held 
electorally accountable if they refuse to remain in step with the evolving 
views of their constituents? Did it reflect “the Constitution[’s] 
presum[ption] that even improvident decisions will”—or at least can, in 
time—“be rectified by the democratic processes[?]”36 The answer to the 
latter two questions must be no. 
 
33
  Transcript of Oral Argument at 38, Perry v. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-144) 
[http://perma.cc/L5XS-FBWT]. 
34
  ELY, supra note 27, at 152. 
35
  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 603 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) [http://perma.cc/V6PX-
658D]. 
36
  City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) [http://perma.cc/8GUW-
RKJ2]. 
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Support for marriage equality has climbed by twenty-two points in 
eleven years.37 Even while marriage equality opponents were still enjoying 
success at the voting booth, attitudes were evolving: between 1998 and 
2009, the average vote against mini-DOMAs in statewide referenda 
increased from thirty-one percent to forty-six percent.38 Given the shift in 
public attitudes toward gay marriage that underlay these numbers, it seems 
reasonable to assume that, in a world where marriage discrimination was 
merely statutory, gays and their allies could be slowly but steadily winning 
marriage equality state by state. In that scenario, it would be difficult to 
justify the Supreme Court stepping into the matter this soon. The problem is 
that, even as public acceptance of gay marriage has continued to grow, in a 
majority of states the process for translating social change into legal and 
policy change cannot work the way it is intended to. Thus, marriage 
equality proponents are left with only two choices: mount difficult and 
expensive campaigns to begin un-amending twenty-eight state constitutions 
(in reality, doing so in more than perhaps one or two states remains a 
practical impossibility right now)39 or look to the federal courts and federal 
Constitution. 
Collectively, the state constitutional mini-DOMAs were not merely 
benign initiatives to assert majoritarian democratic control over the 
definition of marriage. The central political process problem of the mini-
DOMAs is that they were not intended simply to enact marriage 
discrimination, but rather to freeze it in place indefinitely; to permanently 
disadvantage the group seeking to marry; to effectively shut down the 
legislative and legal debate over marriage equality just as it was getting off 
the ground; and to insulate the question from future legislative 
reconsideration or state judicial review. 
Consider that not one of the thirteen states that enacted constitutional 
gay marriage bans in 2004 had previously permitted same-sex marriage, 
meaning “the referenda deprived nobody of marriage rights that already 
existed.”40 What these amendments did do was to “make it harder for those 
states to adopt gay marriage in the future, as legislatures would be 
powerless to act by statute.”41 As of now, in a majority of states, the 
ordinary legislative process through which family law (and almost all other 
social regulations) is made has been disabled when it comes to same-sex 
marriage. A key purpose of the constitutional mini-DOMAs was to make it 
impossible for legislators to assess and respond to social and political 
 
37
  Craighill and Clement, supra note 21. 
38
  STONE, supra note 12, at 132. 
39
  See Trip Gabriel and Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Ohio Gay-Marriage Push Divides Some Advocates, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/24/us/politics/ohio-gay-marriage-push-
divides-some-advocates.html [http://perma.cc/CP9N-VPZ8]. 
40
  KLARMAN, supra note 14, at 108. 
41
  Id. 
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change and the shifting preferences of their constituents. 
The spirit of these efforts was captured by a Georgia Republican 
politician who urged his state to adopt its mini-DOMA because it would 
“set in stone that marriage in this country is a union between one man and 
one woman. The laws of man did not create marriage; the laws of man 
should not alter marriage.”42 A Georgia newspaper editorial said the 
measure would “put the institution [of marriage] back where it belongs, 
above both the courts and the Legislature.”43 In Arizona, the speaker of the 
state’s House of Representatives said the measure would “put current state 
law in the [Arizona] Constitution so that it withstands any future legal or 
legislative challenges.”44 The effect of these mini-DOMAs, as a North 
Carolina news account observed, was to “[make] it extremely difficult for 
same-sex marriage to ever become legal.”45 
Mini-DOMA proponents seized the moment to cement discrimination 
into their states’ fundamental law just before the sea change in public 
attitudes began. Even as the tides have now shifted against marriage 
discrimination, the remarks of one mini-DOMA proponent are telling. After 
Indiana’s legislature recently delayed a mini-DOMA from going to the 
voters during 2014, one frustrated Republican state senator complained that 
“[t]he can keeps getting kicked down the road while the culture changes and 
opponents [of the amendment] grow.”46 In other words, we must put 
marriage discrimination permanently into place before too many people 
change their minds and we lose the opportunity to do so! But this is not a 
valid argument for amending a document that is supposed to be about 
timeless and fundamental principles. 
Indeed, a critical reason why mini-DOMAs raise red flags from a 
political process standpoint is that state regulation of the family, including 
the qualifications and prerequisites for marriage, is typically accomplished 
by statute, not constitutional amendments. Constitutions are about 
fundamental law—things like the organization and powers of government, 
and the retained rights and immunities of individuals. Using constitutional 
amendments to impose disadvantages against one group in an area 
traditionally governed by statutory law is, at the least, a “[d]iscrimination[] 
 
42
  Phil Gingrey, Editorial, Marriage Established by God, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, Feb. 
26, 2004, at 15A. 
43
  Dan Wolfe, Editorial, Gay Marriage Amendment: Put Sacred Institution Beyond Courts’ Reach, 
ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, Nov. 1, 2004, at 13A. 
44
  Amanda J. Crawford, Legislators Push Ban on Gay Marriage, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Feb. 12, 2008, 
12:00 AM), http://archive.azcentral.com/specials/special12/articles/0212gay-marriage0212.html 
[http://perma.cc/L99-NCLS]. 
45
  Mike Kernels, Black Clergy Fight Amendment in Greensboro, WINSTON-SALEM JOURNAL (May 
7, 2012, 9:41 AM), http://www.journalnow.com/news/elections/local/article_c855a2c8-e03b-58bc-
97d8-b45b08c92709.html [http://perma.cc/S4P5-48PD]. 
46
  Michael Auslen, HJR 3 Debate over for Now, IND. DAILY STUDENT (Feb. 18, 2014, 12:39 AM), 
http://idsnews.com/news/story.aspx?id=96690 [http://perma.cc/3729-DR4P]. 
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of an unusual character” that “suggest[s] careful consideration”47 in the 
form of heightened scrutiny. The mere fact that a transient political majority 
may feel strongly about a volatile policy question does not suffice to make 
the issue a fundamental one of constitutional importance.48 
For these reasons, Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson of the Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, a prominent judicial conservative, has condemned 
constitutional mini-DOMAs as “traged[ies]” that offend the “American 
constitutional tradition” and “risk trivializing” constitutions.49 Following the 
wave of mini-DOMAs approved in 2004, he wrote: 
[I]t is legislative bodies that broker compromises among opposing beliefs and 
zealous factions, and it is legislatures that adapt to changing public preferences 
and circumstances. It is impossible to predict what views electoral majorities 
may entertain five, ten, twenty, or fifty years hence on same-sex relations. It is 
the job of legislatures, not constitutions, to reflect evolving standards and to 
register change from whatever direction it may arrive.50 
Of course, another reason that mini-DOMA proponents pushed for 
discrimination in the form of constitutional amendments was that mere 
statutory laws were vulnerable to being overturned by “activist judges”—
that is, state judiciaries applying their own state constitutions.51 But here, 
too, there is a political process problem. Because most state judges are 
subject to election or retention, and are thus held democratically 
accountable, judges can be regarded as integral parts of their state political 
systems.
 52 Accordingly, state judicial review typically does not present 
counter-majoritarian concerns in the same way as federal judicial review. 
An intention to disable state judicial review of same-sex marriage, like an 
intention to disable future legislative reconsideration, should thus also 
amount to an improper purpose by the lights of political process theory, 
because it singles out one issue and changes the ordinary rules of the game 
in a way that is intended to consistently disadvantage one group and 
perpetuate discrimination. 
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Mini-DOMAs are even more disreputable from a political process 
perspective because they were often a tool to mobilize anti-gay fear and 
animus in the service of partisan politics. For example, President George 
W. Bush’s 2004 re-election campaign worked closely with the proponents 
of state constitutional amendments, knowing that “[g]ay marriage referenda 
would inspire religious conservatives to vote, make gay marriage more 
salient in voter choices between political candidates, and put Democrat 
politicians on the defensive.”53 
Indeed, the mini-DOMA campaigns were frequently marked by 
virulent anti-gay animus—a reality that has gone largely unremarked upon 
in current federal marriage litigation. Prominent religious conservative 
leaders with powerful media capabilities and large national followings like 
James Dobson, founder of the group Focus on the Family, called the fight 
against gay marriage “our D-Day, or Gettysburg or Stalingrad.”54 One 
legislator remarked in 2004 that supporters of his state’s mini-DOMA had 
shown “an unparalleled level of zeal, intolerance and hatred” toward gays.55 
And the district court in Perry found that California’s Proposition 8 
campaign presented voters with a “multitude of television, radio and 
[I]nternet-based advertisements and messages” intended to “convey[] to 
voters that same-sex relationships are inferior to opposite-sex relationships 
and dangerous to children.”56 
Moreover, the suggestion that the only purpose of the constitutional 
mini-DOMAs was a benign and democratically legitimate one—to protect a 
traditional definition of marriage—is belied by the fact that most of these 
amendments reach beyond marriage to also prohibit civil unions and other 
forms of legal recognition for gay relationships. And as Justice Scalia has 
aptly observed, “‘preserving the traditional institution of marriage’ is just a 
kinder way of describing the State’s moral disapproval of same-sex 
couples.”57 
IV. DISTINGUISHING SCHUETTE 
The political process branch of equal protection doctrine received 
recent attention from the Court in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend 
Affirmative Action.58 The question in Schuette was whether the Equal 
Protection Clause was violated by a Michigan constitutional amendment, 
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enacted through a voter referendum that prohibited state universities from 
using the limited form of racial affirmative action that the Court had 
allowed in Grutter v. Bollinger. The Court overturned an en banc decision 
from the Sixth Circuit that had relied on two of the Court’s earlier cases 
about the harmful effects of direct democracy on the interests of racial 
minorities: Hunter v. Erickson59 and Washington v. Seattle School District 
No. 1.60 
In Hunter, the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause was violated 
by a voter referendum that overturned an Akron, Ohio, fair-housing 
ordinance and stripped the city council of authority to enact any future such 
ordinance dealing with discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, 
national origin, or ancestry.61 In Seattle School District No. 1, the Court 
applied Hunter to strike down a state statute, also enacted via a referendum, 
that prohibited racially integrative busing and took the matter out of the 
hands of local school boards.62 Together, Hunter and Seattle have come to 
stand for the principle that an electoral majority may not “restructure[] the 
political process” so that “the majority has not only won, but has rigged the 
game to reproduce its success indefinitely.”63 
Although there was no majority opinion in Schuette, the critical flaw in 
the Sixth Circuit’s decision, as at least five of the justices saw it, was that it 
essentially used attitudes toward affirmative action as a proxy for race, 
equating a referendum against affirmative action with constitutionally 
forbidden race discrimination.64 For anyone familiar with the Roberts 
Court’s race jurisprudence, it could not have come as a surprise that the 
Court’s conservative members would rebel against this idea. “It cannot be 
entertained as a serious proposition,” wrote Justice Kennedy for a plurality 
of himself, the Chief Justice, and Justice Alito, “that all individuals of the 
same race think alike” on matters of public policy like affirmative action.65 
In short, the Sixth Circuit’s applications of Hunter and Seattle foundered as 
a matter of equal protection doctrine because at least five justices thought 
the Michigan amendment did not inflict “specific injuries on account of 
race”66 or demonstrate “discriminatory intent”67 in the way that was done by 
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the laws at issue in Hunter and Seattle. Although several Justices in 
Schuette discussed the implications of political process restructuring, the 
Court as a whole provided no guidance on that point. 
In the end, my argument here is unaffected by the outcome in Schuette. 
Unlike a ballot initiative on affirmative action, mini-DOMAs undeniably 
create a discriminatory classification and an intentional injury for equal 
protection purposes: they categorically deny marriage to a specific group of 
people based on their sexual orientation. Moreover, the classification 
involves access to the right of marriage, something the Court has repeatedly 
called “one of the basic civil rights of man.”68 The key task, then, is to 
determine whether this deprivation deserves more than mere baseline 
rational basis scrutiny. I have assumed for purposes of argument that sexual 
orientation, as such, does not create a suspect or quasi-suspect classification 
for all purposes. Under my application of political process theory, the 
justification for heightened scrutiny arises not from the characteristics of the 
group of people affected, but from the extraordinary circumstances through 
which state constitutional mini-DOMAs came into being between 1998 and 
2012 in more than half the states. Rather than relying on suspect or quasi-
suspect status under equal protection for particular persons, I suggest that 
the mini-DOMAs are tainted by a disreputable history which points toward 
giving them suspect status as an issue. 
In summary, I am arguing that the specific purposes and circumstances 
of the mini-DOMAs—imposing discrimination against a minority group on 
a volatile and dynamic question of social policy, employing the vehicle of 
constitutional amendments to insure against the group’s ability to redress 
the problem through the ordinary legislative/political process, 
accomplishing this across more than half the states in little more than a 
decade, all in an atmosphere that was often polluted by evident animus and 
ill will—now require that their substance be reviewed with skepticism 
under a heightened burden of justification. I am not arguing that direct 
democracy on controversial questions like gay marriage is always 
incompatible with the Constitution. But if “[a] law declaring that . . . it shall 
be more difficult for one group of citizens than for all others to seek aid 
from the government is itself a denial of equal protection in the most literal 
sense,”69 then a process that is deliberately designed to achieve that same 
result—to “restrict[] those political processes which can ordinarily be 
expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation”70—should at least 
raise judicial eyebrows and force states to provide important, persuasive, 
and substantive justifications. This is especially so when the issue at hand is 
not an isolated matter in one jurisdiction, but a question of national scale 
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involving more than half the states.71 
CONCLUSION 
The “right to marry” for gays and lesbians is a difficult issue for courts 
because “[i]t is fundamentally a disagreement about final ends whose value 
cannot be demonstrated by argument. It is as intractable as (and, as it 
happens, largely coextensive with) religious disagreement.”72 I have argued 
that the circumstances under which the state constitutional mini-DOMAs 
were enacted render them collectively a failure of the political process and 
thus provide a sound justification for heightened, skeptical judicial review 
of their substance. I have advanced no view about the substantive merits of 
the mini-DOMAs, other than that they seem unlikely to survive the 
application of “exacting judicial scrutiny”73 that insists on justifications that 
are “genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to 
litigation.”74 My objective has been simply to provide a clear analytical path 
the Supreme Court could use for getting to such heightened scrutiny, 
something that has been missing in all of its other gay rights decisions. 
To be sure, the Court already has given a form of heightened scrutiny 
that is sometimes called “rational basis with bite” to a sweeping anti-gay 
ballot initiative in Colorado (Romer), a sodomy law in Texas (Lawrence), 
and the federal Defense of Marriage Act (Windsor). But all those cases 
lacked a clear justification for getting to heightened scrutiny, and none 
involved something as monumental as invalidating marriage laws in more 
than half the states. If the Court is going to take that step—and have its 
authority and credibility survive—it needs to apply heightened scrutiny by 
name, not merely by implication, and it needs to explain why it is 
subjecting states to a heavy burden of justification. 
Ironically, the campaign to lock up permanent marriage discrimination 
in as many states as possible, as quickly as possible, planted the seeds of its 
own demise. Had same-sex marriage opponents maintained faith in the 
process of democratic dialogue as translated through the normal legislative 
process, progress toward state-by-state marriage equality may have 
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unfolded at a slower, more natural pace. By now, we would have come a 
shorter distance down the road toward the point where it was appropriate 
for the Supreme Court to step in and play its customary role of dragging 
straggler states into line with a national consensus as it did, for example, 
with interracial marriage and sodomy laws. Instead, the very rationales for 
the constitutional mini-DOMAs, and the manner in which they distorted the 
ordinary process of legislative and political change, now give the Supreme 
Court a principled reason to step in and subject them to skeptical and 
rigorous scrutiny. 
 
